“Multialignment” has been Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s lodestar as he moved India and its foreign policy out of the dead end of nonalignment over the last decade. In Washington to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump last week, Modi got to see—firsthand and in real time—how Trump was developing a multialignment of his own. Trump’s efforts to loosen U.S. commitments to Europe, reach out to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and publicly woo Chinese President Xi Jinping mark an epochal break with the idea of a rules-based international order backed by U.S. power and a collective West. With his vision of America First, Trump is now looking for bilateral deals with other powers to secure U.S. interests. If Trump succeeds in this, multialignment could well become the norm among the major powers of the international system.
In nudging India closer to the United States than ever before, Modi abandoned one of the important but unstated principles of India’s longtime nonalignment policy: keeping a political distance from the United States on global and regional issues. At the same time, Modi chose to maintain India’s old partnership with Russia while sustaining a difficult dialogue with China amid persistent border tensions and a mounting trade deficit. Under Modi, New Delhi also ended its prolonged indifference to Europe by stepping up engagement with key powers, including France, Germany, and Italy, as well as the European Union in Brussels.
“Multialignment” has been Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s lodestar as he moved India and its foreign policy out of the dead end of nonalignment over the last decade. In Washington to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump last week, Modi got to see—firsthand and in real time—how Trump was developing a multialignment of his own. Trump’s efforts to loosen U.S. commitments to Europe, reach out to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and publicly woo Chinese President Xi Jinping mark an epochal break with the idea of a rules-based international order backed by U.S. power and a collective West. With his vision of America First, Trump is now looking for bilateral deals with other powers to secure U.S. interests. If Trump succeeds in this, multialignment could well become the norm among the major powers of the international system.
In nudging India closer to the United States than ever before, Modi abandoned one of the important but unstated principles of India’s longtime nonalignment policy: keeping a political distance from the United States on global and regional issues. At the same time, Modi chose to maintain India’s old partnership with Russia while sustaining a difficult dialogue with China amid persistent border tensions and a mounting trade deficit. Under Modi, New Delhi also ended its prolonged indifference to Europe by stepping up engagement with key powers, including France, Germany, and Italy, as well as the European Union in Brussels.
Yet there is no denying U.S. centrality in India’s multialignment. Realists in New Delhi recognize the importance of partnering with Washington to accelerate India’s economic, technological, and military modernization. At the same time, they value India’s need to retain freedom of action and avoid the pitfalls of tying its mast too tightly to a great power whose interests are bound to vary over time. With Trump questioning the value of alliances and lashing out at some of Washington’s oldest and closest partners, India’s prudence appears wise. Sensing the political and geopolitical earthquakes in Washington, New Delhi pushed for an early Modi-Trump meeting that could impart stability to India’s most important relationship.
Recognizing the importance of illegal immigration and tariffs for the new establishment in Washington, the Modi government moved quickly to address both issues. It agreed to the deportation of undocumented migrants back to India and to fast-track negotiations for a trade deal. Earlier in February, India had already announced that it would cut some tariffs, including on cars and high-end motorcycles, that impact U.S. producers. India is also exploring the possibility of higher energy imports from the United States, including oil, gas, and civilian nuclear reactors. Trump wants India to buy more U.S.-made weapons, so Modi agreed to wrap up some of the deals under negotiation for a while in return for Trump’s agreement to review current restrictions on defense cooperation with and exports to India. Beyond defense, the two leaders also decided to build on the expansive cooperation on critical and emerging technologies that had been agreed under the Biden administration. Given past gaps between promise and performance, the two sides want to see concrete outcomes by the time Trump visits New Delhi for a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue summit later this year.
Contrary to widespread concern in India that Trump might publicly embarrass Modi, the U.S. president signaled much goodwill. Paradoxically, not being an ally or a perceived free-rider but a willing and capable partner appears to give India more leeway in Washington than traditional U.S. allies these days. Part of the mix may also be Trump’s presumed tendency to treat strong leaders—including adversaries—with greater respect than the leaders of European and Asian allies, whom he seems to perceive as weak or subservient.
India appears better placed than most major powers in dealing with Trump’s disruption of the post-1945 global system and balance of power. Consider, for example, Trump’s enthusiasm for ending the Russia-Ukraine war and improving relations with Putin. India will benefit significantly if these outcomes are realized. No wonder, then, that Modi endorsed Trump’s Ukraine peace initiative. Coping with the economic and geopolitical consequences of the war in Ukraine has been a major challenge for India, so any easing of the conflict will be welcome. India will particularly appreciate the effect that U.S.-Russian accommodation over Ukraine and a loosening or removal of sanctions will have on oil prices. New Delhi is a major consumer of hydrocarbons and imports most of them.
India’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the surge in its oil imports from Moscow since 2022 drew much criticism in the West. Settling the conflict will not only lift that shadow from New Delhi’s ties with the West but also improve the chances for a more balanced Asia now dominated by China. New Delhi is acutely conscious of a geopolitical pattern: Conflict with Russia in Europe has usually encouraged the West to make nice to China. New Delhi will hope that a sustainable U.S.-Russian accommodation over security in Europe will help focus Washington’s energies on stabilizing Asia. That, indeed, is one of the arguments among Republicans for pivoting away from Europe. India will also hope that Trump can persuade Putin to follow a more independent policy in Asia rather than tagging along as Xi’s little brother.
New Delhi has much to gain if Europe finally decides to reclaim responsibility for its own security and become a credible geopolitical actor. India and Europe can do more together on security in their shared neighborhood stretching from the Mediterranean across the Middle East to the Indian Ocean. Some of the new imperatives for India and Europe in Trump’s new world of great-power politics might come to the fore when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by all 27 EU commissioners, travels to New Delhi later this month to reboot the bloc’s long-dormant strategic partnership with India.
On the face of it, a United States that pivots to Asia is welcome in India. Trump, however, has added some new wrinkles to U.S. China policy. His eagerness to “get along” with Xi is sending mixed signals across Asia. On the one hand, Republican China hawks occupy key positions on Trump’s national security team. During the administration’s engagement with Modi and other visitors from Asia over the last few weeks, Washington has hardened its position in relation to the Indo-Pacific and China.
On the other hand, Trump appears to be leaving the door open for a big, beautiful deal with Xi. Could Trump consider a grand bargain with China in Asia, much in the manner he is attempting one with Russia in Europe? India is less vulnerable than Japan, South Korea, and, most obviously, Taiwan to a big shift in U.S. policy on China, but New Delhi’s economic and security challenges would certainly become bigger. When an Indian reporter sought to bait Trump into talking tough on China during the joint press conference with Modi, he refused. Instead, he reaffirmed his desire to get along well with Xi. Trump pointed to India’s border conflict with China, offering to help diffuse it if asked.
There is always a faction in New Delhi that thinks an accommodation with Beijing is right around the corner—and that India must keep pushing for it. As much as this might be another prong in a multialignment strategy, it is unrealistic for the time being, given the massive asymmetry in power that lets China enjoy the upper hand. While Beijing could make a few minor adjustments in relations, it has little strategic incentive to ease New Delhi’s problems, and this structural condition is unlikely to dissipate in the near term. That leaves India to focus on building stronger ties with the United States even as it pursues multialignment. India’s answer to a potential U.S.-China detente lies in doing even more with Washington—for only Washington is able and likely willing to help strengthen India’s comprehensive national power. Modi and Trump have created the template for doing so.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.
