During his first term in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump took bold action that many had considered unthinkable at the time: He approved the delivery of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, which was fighting a low-intensity war against Russian invaders and Russia-backed separatists, and Georgia, which was also under partial Russian occupation. Less than a year into his term, Trump thus did something that his predecessor, Barack Obama, had refused to do over the course of eight years. In the case of Ukraine, U.S. support shifted from non-lethal aid under Obama to actual weapons under Trump. The Javelins, sniper rifles, and rocket launchers delivered by Trump played an important role in repelling the Russian attack on Kyiv during the early days of the 2022 invasion.
At the time, many foreign-policy commentators struggled to reconcile these moves with Trump’s “America First” worldview. But the decision to arm Georgia and Ukraine in the shadow of Obama’s “reset” with Russian President Vladimir Putin—just like the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani in the shadow of Obama’s Iran deal—were arguably America First actions. They placed support for the United States’ own allies and partners before hopelessly naive engagement with the country’s adversaries.
During his first term in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump took bold action that many had considered unthinkable at the time: He approved the delivery of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, which was fighting a low-intensity war against Russian invaders and Russia-backed separatists, and Georgia, which was also under partial Russian occupation. Less than a year into his term, Trump thus did something that his predecessor, Barack Obama, had refused to do over the course of eight years. In the case of Ukraine, U.S. support shifted from non-lethal aid under Obama to actual weapons under Trump. The Javelins, sniper rifles, and rocket launchers delivered by Trump played an important role in repelling the Russian attack on Kyiv during the early days of the 2022 invasion.
At the time, many foreign-policy commentators struggled to reconcile these moves with Trump’s “America First” worldview. But the decision to arm Georgia and Ukraine in the shadow of Obama’s “reset” with Russian President Vladimir Putin—just like the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani in the shadow of Obama’s Iran deal—were arguably America First actions. They placed support for the United States’ own allies and partners before hopelessly naive engagement with the country’s adversaries.
In his second term, however, Trump has struggled to define what his America First foreign policy means in the context of Ukraine, to the extent that his critics have accused him of taking Russia’s side. That may have started to change this week during a joint appearance in the Oval Office with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte. It was announced that several billion dollars’ worth of U.S.-made weapons will be delivered in the coming weeks. While most details of the plan remain undisclosed, officials confirmed that it will include several Patriot anti-missile batteries. Additional weapons systems, including long-range strike capabilities, are also reported to be under consideration. Furthermore, these new weapons will be entirely paid for by European countries and delivered to them to give to Ukraine. This allows Trump to walk a political tightrope with his base, many of whom are skeptical about more aid to Ukraine.
At the same time, Trump gave Putin 50 days to come to the negotiating table in good faith. If he fails to do so, Trump says he will consider dramatically escalating sanctions and tariffs against Russia and the countries buying its oil. Already, Russian officials are mocking Trump’s deadline because he has made similar ultimatums in the past, only for nothing to happen when the target date passed. Also, 50 days is a long time in Ukraine. Assuming that Russia maintains it current firing rate of several hundred drones and missiles per night, 50 more days could easily mean 15,000-20,000 more drone attacks over the period.
There is no question about Trump’s sincerity in wanting to bring the war to an end. The problem is not his intention, but the lack of a coherent, realistic policy path to achieve that goal. Some of the blame lies with his team—particularly at the Department of Defense.
The most troubling example came earlier this month, when the Pentagon abruptly halted weapons deliveries to Ukraine, including shipments that were already staged in Poland. The decision blindsided not just Ukraine and the Europeans, but many people in Washington—including, perhaps, Trump himself. When questioned about it, he appeared unaware of the decision.
The Pentagon’s poorly guided decision to halt arms transfers came at a terrible time for both Ukraine and Trump. For Ukraine, many of the delayed weapons were desperately needed air defense equipment—at a time when Russia was launching nighttime barrages of hundreds of missiles and drones at Ukrainian cities. For Trump, the sudden weapons freeze undermined a rare moment of geopolitical momentum after a successful NATO summit, a decisive U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and a U.S.-brokered cease-fire in the Iran-Israel war.
Together, these moves could have created an opening for Trump to force the Kremlin to the negotiating table. Instead, the Pentagon’s sudden pause of arms shipments sent the opposite signal—of U.S. flip-flopping and internal disagreement—thereby weakening Trump’s hand at a critical moment. This is why Trump’s announcement in the Oval Office this week was so crucial. Not only did it send the right signals to Kyiv, Brussels, and Moscow, but senior officials in the Defense Department are now on notice to get behind the new policy of pressuring the Kremlin.
On the campaign trail, Trump made ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the cornerstone of his foreign policy. And without question, it has proved to be the most complex and demanding task set before him. There is a feeling that Trump has lost control of the diplomatic process he sought to implement and that Putin is now setting the terms. This week’s White House announcement is a good first step in regaining control.
In addition to this week’s military aid announcement, there are other concrete steps he can take right now to put things back on track.
The first—and most important—step is recognizing that a just and fair peace is in Trump’s own best interest. Any outcome that suggests Russia “won” in Ukraine would severely damage his credibility as a statesman abroad and his popularity at home; the vast majority of Americans, including Republicans, do not trust Putin. If Moscow is seen as emerging with gains, Trump’s critics at home and abroad will rightly question the strength and strategy behind his foreign policy.
He also needs to drop the line that this is “Biden’s war” and recognize that the current state of the conflict is his responsibility. Blaming former President Joe Biden may have resonated on the campaign trail, but Trump has now been in the Oval Office for six months. Disowning the war is no longer politically tenable, and it certainly doesn’t help shape a solution.
After all, if one considers the full timeline of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—from the unprovoked invasion of Crimea in February 2014 to the present day—Trump has now been in office for nearly 40 percent of that period. Key events in the earlier phase of the conflict occurred during his first term, such as the 2017 Battle of Avdiivka—widely considered one of the largest clashes in the war up until that point—and the Kerch Strait incident, when Russia seized three Ukrainian naval vessels and detained their crews. Neither of these incidents resulted in meaningful consequences for the Kremlin. Trump cannot be seen as a mere outsider in this war.
Second, Trump should ensure that all existing Ukraine aid already authorized and appropriated by Congress is used. At this point there is no excuse for allowing this aid to be left off the table. He should also call on Congress to pass a new Ukraine aid supplemental when current aid runs out—one that could be financed using proceeds from the recently signed minerals deal between Washington and Kyiv. It is great that European allies will purchase U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine. But if Putin does not satisfy Trump’s calls for negotiating in 50 days, the White House needs a more robust plan in place to aid Ukraine, and this will require additional resources from Congress.
Third, the Trump administration should also develop a strategy to boost Ukraine’s defense sector and integrate it more closely with U.S. defense contractors and military technology start-ups. Before Russia’s 2014 invasion, Ukraine ranked among the top 10 global defense exporters, not least due to its highly skilled, innovative, and educated defense workforce. Since the start of the war, the Ukrainians have introduced groundbreaking weapons systems, pioneering many new types of semi-autonomous weapons and drones. Strengthening Ukraine’s defense industry is not just about getting weapons to the front; it’s one of the most effective long-term guarantees of Ukraine’s security, with many benefits to the U.S. defense sector as well.
Fourth, the administration should pursue an America First energy policy. Congress and the executive branch should lift all remaining restrictions on liquefied natural gas exports. Trump’s efforts to unshackle U.S. oil and gas production, combined with his strong relationships with the Gulf states, could give him powerful leverage to influence global energy prices. By flooding the market and undercutting Russia’s energy revenues, the United States would be striking at one of the last remaining pillars of the Russian economy.
Fifth, Trump must take concrete steps to close sanctions loopholes. Although the Biden administration rolled out aggressive sanctions, enforcement always fell short. Russia has adapted by redirecting trade through a web of third-party countries and intermediaries, effectively skirting Western pressure. The White House needs to have a plan in place so that it is ready on day 51 if Putin does not come to the table.
Sixth, Washington should support Ukraine in its asymmetric and hybrid operations inside Russia. According to some reports, Trump recently encouraged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to strike targets deep inside Russia to “make them feel the pain.” As demonstrated by Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb attack against Russian strategic bombers and airfields, the Ukrainians have the ingenuity, creativity, and determination to apply pressure on the Kremlin on their own terms.
But the United States should not stand idly by. Even if it’s done behind the scenes, Washington should provide appropriate levels of intelligence sharing and technical support where it is needed to support Ukraine’s efforts to strike military and related infrastructure targets deep inside Russia. These operations not only serve Ukraine, but also broader U.S. strategic interests in containing and degrading Russia’s military capabilities and influence around the globe.
Finally, the United States should seek to undermine Russia’s global influence and complicate the Kremlin’s strategic calculus at every opportunity. Whether in Africa, Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, or the Middle East, the United States should actively and—more importantly—covertly frustrate Russian efforts. The goal here is simple: Raise the costs of aggression for the Kremlin and deny it any sense of impunity, not just in Ukraine.
Trump has three and a half years left in the Oval Office. Whether he likes it or not, the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war is going to feature prominently in his legacy. He has a rare opportunity to shape the course of events in such a way that not only benefits how he will go down in history, but the future stability and security of the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies. The path forward is relatively clear. If he wants to get Russia to the negotiating table, real pressure has to be applied. It is time to acknowledge that Trump, as president and commander in chief, has the power, authority, and opportunity to shape the outcome of this war in a way that serves U.S. national interests and enshrines his legacy. All that remains is for him to find the will to act.
